中文摘要
金融危机以来，国际贸易保护主义抬头，反倾销被一些国家作为一种贸易保护手段滥用。本文就反倾销的合理性和有效性进行了分析。本文的分析是以反倾销税实施的经济效果分析为基础的，在两国模型中，出口国对进口国实施倾销，最终会将本国产品彻底挤出市场，而征收反倾销税以后，根据征收的反倾销税的大小，出口国的产品被部分的挤出进口国市场，双方进行博弈，最终达到古诺均衡.本文根据反倾销税实施的目的，来判定反倾销税实施的有效性；并且根据反倾销的国际准则，判定反倾销税的合理性，最终结论得出：征收反倾销税是否会得到政府想要的效果，还受到经济规模、贸易转移、投资替代、出口国报复等一系列条件的制约，同时，反倾销税也不一定总是合理的，因为受到反倾销的。会优化资源配置、福利最大化、正常价格界定不一定客观、规模经济发展和企业竞争不可被视作倾销、反倾销与政治不应当有联系。
关键词：反倾销税； 出口； 古诺均衡
Abstract
After the finance crisis, the trade protection is becoming worse and anti-dumping has been used as one of the trade protection methods. this paper analyzed the anti-dumping tariff’s rationalism and effectiveness. This paper is based on the anti-dumping tariff’s economics analysis and assumed there are only two country in the world, the export implement dumping to the import country and finally will screw the import country’s produces out of the market. However, if the import country impose tariff, it will finally get to Cournot equilibrium and the exporter and the domestic produces will separate the whole market. After analyzed the import implementation of anti-dumping duties’ purpose, this paper analyzed the effectiveness of anti-dumping duties and its reasonable nature. And this paper argues: whether imposing anti-dumping duties will reach their goals is determined by other conditions such as economies of scale, trade diversion effect, investment substitution effect, exporting countries retaliate. Meanwhile, the anti-dumping duty is not necessarily always reasonable. Because Optimize resource allocation, welfare is maximized, normal price is not necessarily the objective, the development of the economies of scale and enterprise competitiveness cannot be regarded as dumping, anti-dumping and politics should not be linked to define.
目录
（三）反倾销税征收的影响及政府反倾销税决策制定的原则… 11
- 反倾销税的价格效应… 15
- 反倾销税的国内生产保护效应… 15
- 反倾销税的贸易转移效应… 15
- 进口国的贸易条件恶化… 16
- 直接投资的进口替代效应… 16
- 消费效应… 16
- 会引起出口国的贸易报复… 16
